tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post4003937714807829098..comments2023-12-09T03:51:33.158-05:00Comments on Various Consequences: Converging and Diverging ViewsJoshua Stultshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03506970399027046387noreply@blogger.comBlogger13125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-42219463269268581862017-11-26T18:08:18.623-05:002017-11-26T18:08:18.623-05:00Are Disagreements Honest? "A robust result i...<a href="http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/deceive.pdf" rel="nofollow">Are Disagreements Honest</a>? "A robust result is that honest <br />truth-seeking agents with common priors should not knowingly disagree." Of course, the hard part is the priors...<br /><br />by way of this post: <a href="http://www.overcomingbias.com/2017/11/why-be-contrarian.html" rel="nofollow">Why Be Contrarian</a>? Joshua Stultshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506970399027046387noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-40794640186232155102017-02-12T11:04:58.965-05:002017-02-12T11:04:58.965-05:00Somewhat related: Why We Mix Fact & Value Tal...Somewhat related: <a href="http://www.overcomingbias.com/2017/02/we-we-mix-fact-value-talk.html" rel="nofollow">Why We Mix Fact & Value Talk</a>Joshua Stultshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506970399027046387noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-83893380478378921122016-01-09T08:05:58.740-05:002016-01-09T08:05:58.740-05:00Thanks for your comments on this post. Definitely...Thanks for your comments on this post. Definitely provoked some more thought on my part. <br /><br />The similarity with converging Markov Chains, and sensitivity to initial conditions is a pretty good analogy. It's not perfect though. The reason you get different answers from two Markov Chains you started with different initializations is that you haven't run them long enough. So the difference is down to error. <br /><br />Jaynes' point is subtly different: <i>disagreement can legitimately exist without any error by either party</i>. Joshua Stultshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506970399027046387noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-29115152334250614522015-11-26T09:21:58.068-05:002015-11-26T09:21:58.068-05:00Thanks for commenting. I agree: where you start ...Thanks for commenting. I agree: where you start matters in a couple of ways. The priors for the claim itself matter, and those are likely to be correlated with priors that effect how you evaluate incoming evidence. The evidence is hardly ever just "the evidence". It's usually another claim, and the who/what/where/how/why of the claim matter. Joshua Stultshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506970399027046387noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-57539375067300114762015-10-23T15:14:49.194-04:002015-10-23T15:14:49.194-04:00Seems like a markov chain with differing starting ...Seems like a markov chain with differing starting points.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-70068781606802588352015-10-23T02:27:06.474-04:002015-10-23T02:27:06.474-04:00Ah, just reread my comment. I meant the probabilit...Ah, just reread my comment. I meant the probabilities of "given the claim is true, my opponent would have claimed it to be true " vs. "given the claim is false, my opponent would still have claimed it to be true". Of these two, the first one should have higher probability, which should shift my belief the appropriate (possibly infinitesimal) amount towards agreement.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-79225387860533997912015-10-23T02:22:43.381-04:002015-10-23T02:22:43.381-04:00Isn't it still irrational (i.e., ignoring the ...Isn't it still irrational (i.e., ignoring the result of a Bayesian calculation) to assign a higher probability to "the claim is false and my opponents claim it to be true despite it because that furthers their agenda" than to "the claim is true and my opponents claim it to be true either because it is true or because they would have done so in any case". The fact that my opponent whom I believe to be deceitful states a factual claim that supports his position should never lower my probability for this claim, since the probability that he will state the claim is still slightly higher if it is true than if it is false. For example, if it is false there is an incentive for my opponent to just not mention it instead of perpetuating it, because being found out as a fraud can have negative impact on one's cause.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-9735921934457319162010-06-17T08:16:46.104-04:002010-06-17T08:16:46.104-04:00On (Bayesian) rationality for individuals,
We give...On (Bayesian) rationality for individuals,<br /><i>We give a weak system of consistency axioms for "rational" behavior. The axioms do not even assume the existence of an ordering for axioms. The conclusions are still that utility functions exist, both unconditionally and conditionally given the state of nature; the unconditional utility is a weighted linear combination of the conditional utilities; and the separation of the weights from the conditional scales is not necessary and even the possibility is questioned. </i><br /><a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=related:VIX6guUFWO8J:scholar.google.com/&hl=en&as_sdt=100000000000" rel="nofollow">A weak system of axioms for “rational” behavior and the nonseparability of utility from prior</a><br /><br />And a bit more on the extension to groups,<br /><i>An outstanding challenge for "Bayesian" decision theory is to extend its norms of rationality from individuals to groups. Specifically, can the beliefs and values of several Bayesian decision makers be amalgamated into a single Bayesian profile that respects their common preferences over options? If rational parties to a negotiation can agree on collective actions merely by considering mutual gains, is it not possible to find a consensus Bayes model for their choices? In other words, can their shared strict preferences over acts be reproduced with a Bayesian rationale (maximizing ex- pected utility) from beliefs (probabilities) and desires (utilities) that signify a rational compromise between their rival positions?</i><br /><a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=related:bybMlh4qoSsJ:scholar.google.com/&hl=en&as_sdt=100000000000&as_vis=1" rel="nofollow">Shared preferences of two Bayesian decision makers</a>Joshua Stultshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506970399027046387noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-62528137874849620702010-03-12T15:55:08.955-05:002010-03-12T15:55:08.955-05:00Also from that Risk-based decision analysis paper:...Also from that Risk-based decision analysis paper:<br /><i>Focusing solely on a single feared outcome, believing only that it would be terrible or that there is some non-zero chance that it will occur, is not a sufficient basis for taking precautionary action.</i>Joshua Stultshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506970399027046387noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-3019109435833090392010-03-02T12:13:45.898-05:002010-03-02T12:13:45.898-05:00Gelman's take on forming opinions about scient...<a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2009/12/how_do_i_form_m.html" rel="nofollow">Gelman's take on forming opinions about scientific questions</a> goes into his experience with consensus in his own field.Joshua Stultshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506970399027046387noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-85226924868119329432010-02-25T10:39:31.361-05:002010-02-25T10:39:31.361-05:00This paper, Risk-based decision analysis in suppor...This paper, <a href="http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/homepages/roger_pielke/envs_5120/week_13/risk_based_descision.pdf" rel="nofollow">Risk-based decision analysis in support of precautionary policies [pdf]</a>, talks a bit about decision analysis when there are multiple stake-holders that bring differing values and prior information to the table:<br /><i>This is not to say that different parties must agree on the appropriate course of action, however. Full, rational consideration may show that a decision that appears to have the appropriate amount of 'prudent precaution' for its proponents appears reckless and non-precautionary to opponents with different beliefs and value systems.</i><br /><br />Their discussion of the <i>precautionary principle</i> is interesting. My take is that it is basically a way to avoid rational decision making (because that process is 'strained' when catastrophic things are quite uncertain), it then supports irrationally avoiding action whose avoidance would not be warranted by an honest consideration of our state of knowledge (subjective degree of belief). <br /><br /><i>Precautionary Principle:</i> The triumph of fear over reason.Joshua Stultshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506970399027046387noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-59001139574081852592010-02-19T05:21:36.537-05:002010-02-19T05:21:36.537-05:00Fascinating stuff. Especially if your starting po...Fascinating stuff. Especially if your starting point "Suppose that two people, Mr A and Mr B have differing views (due to their differing prior information) about some issue"<br /><br />has (due to their predisposition to believe it) is actually the baseline i.e. it's not necessarily a logical choice from the off.<br /><br />I recently encountered this phenomenon in practice on a jury.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5822805028291837738.post-28291554419993768882010-02-14T12:06:24.183-05:002010-02-14T12:06:24.183-05:00Jaynes seems almost prescient:
To make matters wor...Jaynes seems almost prescient:<br /><i>To make matters worse, some scientists, and still more people among environmental and other organizations, made statements not supported by what was reliably known. An example was implicit or explicit claims that hurricanes were increasing as a result of human interference with the climate. There was no way for the general public to know whether scientists actually made such claims, still less whether the claims were made honestly or disingenuously.</i><br /><a href="http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/a-historian-looks-back-at-the-climate-fight/#more-14419" rel="nofollow">-- A Historian Looks 'Back' at the Climate Fight</a>Joshua Stultshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03506970399027046387noreply@blogger.com